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Dupuis: Case Law Update

1. Case Law Update
James H. Dupuls, Jr.
Liskow & Lewis, PLC,
Lafayette, Louisiana
I. Mineral Senitudes
(1) St Mary Operating Company v. Champagne, 2006-984 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 11/06/06), 945 So.2d 846
This concursus proceeding was filed by St. Mary Operating Company. Made defendants were a group of mineral servitude owners and a
group of landowners. St. Mary was the operator of a well, and held production proceed:; claimed by both the servitude owners and the landowners. At issue was the validity of a mineral servitude created in 1993. The
landowners argved that the servitude was a ten (10) year fixed term servitude, and the servitude owners argued that the servitude was subject to
the rules of prescription of nonuse. The trial court granted summary
judgment, in favor of the landowners, holding that the servitude was created for a fixed term of ten years.
The mineral servitude at issue was created by reservation in a cash
sale deed on June 22, 1993, and contained the following language:
Vendors reserve unto themselves all of the minerals underlying or
which may be produced from the above described tracts for a period
of ten (10) years, this being a reservation of royalties, executive
rights, bonuses, delay rentals, and all other mineral rights whatsoever.
St. Mary began drilling operations on the servitude premises on or
about March 3, 2003. The landowners contended that the servitude terminated on June 22, 1993, irrespective of the fact that sufficient operations and production occurred which could have interrupted prescription
of nonuse, becatse the servitude was created for a fixed term. The mineral servitude owners argued that the servitude was subject to the rules of
prescription, because unless an instrument creating a mineral servitude
clearly provides a statement to the contrary, it is subject to the rules of
prescription.
The court acknowledged that the June 22, 1993 instrument did not
mention prescription, nor did it state in clear terms that the ten year period would be a term not subject to the rules of prescription of non use.
The court made reference to Mineral Code Article 74, which provides in
pertinent part that "[p]arties may either fix the term of a mineral servitude or shorten the applicable period of prescription of nonuse or both."
The court also referred to the comments to Article 74 for the proposition
that if a party wi;hes to create a fixed term mineral servitude not subject
to the rules of prescription, that intention must be specified. Accordingly,
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the court held that the phrase "for a period of ten (10) years" was not sufficient to create a fixed term mineral servitude. Instead, it was simply a
restatement of the default prescriptive period that is assumed in all mineral servitudes. Because the parties did not specify otherwise, the mineral
servitude is subject to the rules of prescription of nonuse. Because the
mineral activities that took place beginning in March of 2003 were sufficient to interrupt prescription of nonuse running against the servitude, the
mineral servitude was still in existence, and the servitude owners were
entitled to the production proceeds.
(2) Weyerhaeuser Company v. A. D. Hinton, LL.C, 2006 WL
3845005, (W.D. La.)
At issue in this case was whether or not a mineral servitude created
in 1971 was still in existence. The servitude was created by reservation
in a sale from Davis Brothers Lumber Company to Willamette Industries, Inc. The parties to the sale agreed that Willamette would interrupt
the running of prescription of nonuse as many times as necessary to
maintain the servitude until 2021. This intent was evidenced in a letter by
Willamette to Davis Brothers dated December 22, 1971. Of course, it
was acknowledged in the letter that the obligation to interrupt prescription was against Louisiana public policy and unenforceable.
Even though the obligation set out in the December 22, 1971 letter
was unenforceable, Willamette executed several instruments between
1977 and 1998 in which it acknowledged prescription of nonuse running
against the servitude. Weyerhaeuser Company is the successor in interest
by merger to Willamette. In this case, it argues that the 1998 instrument
in which prescription was interrupted is an absolute nullity because it
was "premised on an unlawful cause in derogation of laws enacted for
protection of the public interest," and requested that the acknowledgement be rescinded.
Thus, the issue before the court was the effect of the 1998 instrument in which Willamette purported to interrupt the running of prescription of nonuse. The court noted that Weyerhaeuser did not argue about
the invalidity of the acknowledgements in general. Instead, Weyerhaeuser focused on the intent behind the acknowledgements in light of
the December 22, 1971 letter. The court notes that the public policy concerning prescription of nonuse prohibits attempts to renounce prescription in advance, or to interrupt prescription by means other than those
expressly recognized by law.
Based on the foregoing, the court was of the opinion that even
though Willamette's intentions in the December 22, 1971 letter are not
legally enforceable, Willamette freely chose to extend the life of the servitude by a means expressly recognized by law, namely by executing an
instrument interrupting the running of prescription of nonuse in accordance with Mineral Code articles 54 and 55. Therefore, the voluntary
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execution and recordation of the instruments were valid and effective,
and interrupted prescription of nonuse running against the servitude.
II. Joint Opeiations
(3) Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2006)

The plaintiffs in this case were several mineral lessees who were
parties to four joint operating agreements with Texaco Exploration and
Production, Inc. ("TEPI"). Plaintiffs were non-operators under the operating agreement, and TEPI was the operator. The joint operating agreements contained "preferential rights" clauses, which is a type of right of
first refusal. In 1999, TEPI offered for sale its entire working interests in
sixteen oil and gas fields in Louisiana, and solicited bids on these properties. The successful bidder was EnerVest, with an offer of approximately
$78.7 million. TEPI and the plaintiffs exchanged various letters and correspondences concerning the preferential rights, and TEPI eventually
sold the properties to EnerVest. The plaintiffs then sued TEPI, alleging
that it violated the preferential rights provisions found in the joint operating agreements. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of
TEPI, finding no violation, and the plaintiffs appealed.
At issue in the case was whether or not TEPI's actions violated the
preferential rights provisions in the four joint operating agreements. One
of the joint cperating agreements applies to the sale by a party of "its
interest, in whole or in part, in the properties affected by this agreement."
The other jo:.nt operating agreements all provide that the preferential
rights will extend to the sale of parties' specified interest "unitized substances."
In order to determine whether or not TEPI violated the preferential
rights provisions, the court looked to Louisiana law concerning rights of
first refusal, and framed the issues as follows:
(a) The "thing" that is the subject of the right of first refusal under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2625;
(b) Whether TEPI clearly and unambiguously described the property offered to the plaintiffs in the correspondences exchanged
among them prior to the sale to EnerVest; and
(c) Whether TEPI offered the same "thing" to the plaintiffs, the
holder of the right of first refusal, on the same terms and conditions,
before selling to EnerVest.
With resiect to the first issue, the court found that TEPI violated all
of the joint operating agreements because while it offered to sell its entire
interest in the property to EnerVest, it did not offer to sell the same interest to the plaintiffs. Specifically, TEPI offered something less than its
entire working interest in the pertinent leases to the plaintiffs. Its offer
did not include any tangible properties, rights of way, pipeline rights or
surface leases. Instead, with respect to these assets, TEPI said that if the
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plaintiffs purchased TEPI's interest, it would need to enter into a production handling agreement with EnerVest because these assets were being
sold to EnerVest. The court's decision applied to all of the joint operating agreements, even the ones that applied only to "unitized substances."
The court stated that when the agreements are read as a whole, they contemplate that the preferential rights provisions apply to tangible assets
used in connection with unit drilling and production. Therefore, under all
of the operating agreements, the court found that TEPI violated the preferential rights provisions by offering to the plaintiffs the opportunity to
purchase only less than all of the property offered to EnerVest.
With respect to the second issue, the court found TEPI did not
clearly and adequately describe the property offered to the plaintiffs. The
record contained no unambiguous written document in which TEPI
clearly described the particular property interests offered to the plaintiffs.
In fact, the record indicated that the plaintiffs expressed uncertainty concerning what properties were being offered.
With respect to the third issue, the court stated that although it was
unclear exactly what property was offered to the plaintiffs, it was clear
that it was less than the entirety of the working interest owned by TEPI.
Because TEPI offered and sold to EnerVest its full working interest, the
court stated that it may be reasonably inferred that TEPI breached all of
the joint operating agreements by failing to offer the same thing for the
same price to both the plaintiffs and EnerVest. It is apparent that TEPI
was obligated to first offer to the plaintiffs the same thing it offered to
EnerVest at the same price. TEPI sold EnerVest its entire working interest for $2,014,861.00. This same price was quoted by TEPI to the plaintiffs as the amount they would have to pay for a property interest that did
not include certain assets, including tangible properties, rights of way,
pipeline rights, and surface leases. Thus, the court concluded that TEPI
did not offer the same thing to the plaintiffs on the same terms and conditions as it offered to EnerVest.
The court then discussed whether or not TEPI might have violated
its obligation of good faith found in Civil Code Article 1759. The court
referenced various factual issues in dispute, including whether or not
TEPI was cooperating with the plaintiffs in connection with their attempts to evaluate the offer from TEPI. The court stated that the record
contained "several implications of TEPI's bad faith."
Based on the foregoing, the court found that a reasonable trier of
fact could find multiple breaches by TEPI of its obligations in connection
with the right of first refusal. Thus, it could not affirm the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of TEPI.
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(4) Double-Eight Oil and Gas, LLC v. Caruthers Producing Company, Inc., 41,451 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 11/20/06), 942 So.2d 1279.
The parties in this case were all owners in indivision of the working
interest in various mineral leases. Defendant Caruthers Producing Company was the operator of certain wells, and the plaintiffs were nonoperators. The plaintiffs alleged that Caruthers took certain actions which
caused the wells to stop producing, and sought damages therefor.
Caruthers answered and filed a reconventional demand asserting that the
plaintiffs owed it for services and materials on the wells.
After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims,
noting that the catalyst giving rise to the lawsuit was literally a "brotherin-law deal" between Scott Pernici, one of the owners of a plaintiff, and
Witt Caruthers, one of the defendants, Pernici being married to
Caruthers' sister. The court noted that the parties did not sign a joint operating agreement, and did not require operator to use AFEs prior to conducting operations on the well.
Plaintiffs first claim was that Caruthers breached its fiduciary duty
to the non-operators by spending significant sums of money unnecessarily by testing and reworking certain wells in order to obtain data that
would benefit Caruthers in drilling wells in other areas. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision that no such breach occurred. The
record contained expert testimony presented by Caruthers that the operations in question were reasonable, necessary and prudent. Furthermore,
the testimony showed that the operations could not have produced any
information that would have been relevant or useful to Caruthers' other
operations.
Plaintiffs second claim was that Caruthers violated Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of this claim, noting that plaintiffs and Caruthers were not
business competitors within the meaning of the Act.
With respect to Caruthers' reconventional demand for reimbursement for its costs expended on the wells, the 2nd Circuit cited Mineral
Code Article 177, which states:
A co-owner of the lessee's interest in a mineral lease may not independently conduct operations or, except as provided in this article
and Article 171, deal with the interest within the consent of its coowner. He may act to prevent waste, destruction, or termination of
the lease and to protect the interest of all, but cannot impose upon
his co-owner liability for any costs or expenses except out of production. In so acting he must act in good faith and must deal with
the interest of the remaining owner or owners in the manner of a
reasonably prudent lessee whose interest is not subject to coownership.
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Under Louisiana law there is no requirement that co-owners of a
mineral lease execute a written operating agreement. In this case, the parties executed an agreement that required the parties to pay their share of
actual costs and, as mentioned above, did not require written consent
prior to the incurrence of costs for actions taken by the operator. Under
Mineral Code Article 177, the operator must have consent of the nonoperators in order to impose pre-production liability on a non-operator.
The court noted that there was evidence presented at the trial court that
the plaintiffs were aware of and consented to Caruthers' operations. This
notice and consent took place verbally, as was the practice of the parties.
With respect to the requirement in Mineral Code Article 177 that a
mineral lease co-owner act in good faith and in a reasonably prudent
manner, the court noted that Caruthers presented expert testimony supporting its operations in connection with attempting to salvage well production, but no contradictory testimony was presented on behalf of the
plaintiffs. Therefore, the trial court was correct in rendering judgment in
favor of Caruthers, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay their share of the
costs incurred.
(5) Davis Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Anderson Exploration Company, Inc.,
2006-180 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 05/31/06), 933 So.2d 227
Anderson Exploration Company, Inc. sued Davis Gulf Coast, Inc.
seeking to be declared the owner of a 25% working interest and a 19
1/4% working interest in certain mineral leases. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Anderson, and Davis appealed.
The dispute involved Davis Gulf Coast, Inc., Anderson Exploration
Company, Inc., Three Sisters Trust, and Austral Oil and Gas Exploration,
Inc. These parties executed a participation agreement, wherein they
agreed to participate in the development of certain mineral leases. In the
agreement, Davis Gulf Coast, the owner of the entire working interest in
the mineral leases, agreed to assign a 25% working interest in the leases
to each of Anderson and Three Sisters in exchange for $75,000. In addition, Anderson and Three Sisters entered into a turnkey drilling agreement with Davis, under which Anderson and Three Sisters agreed to fix a
firm estimated cost for drilling a test well, and Davis would pay 50% of
this estimated cost. Davis paid its cost under the turnkey agreement into
an escrow account, and Three Sisters and Anderson paid the $75,000
required of them in the participation agreement in the form of a credit
against Davis' payment of costs under the turnkey agreement. However,
Davis never delivered the assignments of a 25% working interest in the
mineral leases to either Anderson or Three Sisters.
Operations on the initial well began on May 3, 2001. The operator
of the well changed several times, with both Anderson and Austral operating the well at certain times. Although Davis elected to participate in
the completion of the well, it did not pay for its share of completion costs
-6https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol54/iss1/5
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after being billed for these costs. Davis mortgaged its interest in the
leases, and several service providers filed liens against the well totaling
over $678,000. Finally, Austral, who was the operator of the well at the
time, put Davis in default and demanded that these issues be cured.
The parties exchanged letters in July of 2002 in an attempt to work
out their dispute. Davis argued that the letter agreements constituted a
novation of the participation agreement, and that if Anderson earned any
interest in any well this interest was forfeited by its failure to fulfill the
requirements of :he letter agreement.
A novation is the extinguishment of an existing obligation by the
substitution of a new one. Louisiana Civil Code article 1879. The intention to extinguish the original obligation must be clear and unequivocal.
Novation will not be presumed. Louisiana Civil Code article 1880. The
intent to extinguish the original obligation is necessary. If the intent is
simply to modify the existing obligation, a novation will not occur. Louisiana Civil Code article 1881. The court quoted extensively from the
letters, and concluded that the parties intended to substitute performance
under the letters for the performance under the participation agreement.
Thus, the court concluded that the letters constituted a novation.
With respect to whether or not Anderson was entitled to an interest
in the leases, the court stated that because the letters agreements were a
novation, the pertinent provisions were found therein, and not in the participation agreement. The court quotes from one of the letter agreements,
stating that if the liens and privileges were cancelled of record before a
certain time, then Anderson and Three Sisters would earn the interest
specified in the participation agreement. Because Anderson did not perform its obligation under the letter agreement, the court found that it was
not entitled to an interest in the leases.
III. Authority of Office of Conservation
(6) Energy Management Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471

(5th Cir. 2C06).
Cross Lake, which is the main water source for the City of Shreveport, was transferred by the State of Louisiana to the City of Shreveport
in 1910. At that time, Louisiana reserved the minerals in and under the
lake. In 1990, Shreveport enacted Ordinance 221, which (i) prohibited
outright any new drilling within one thousand (1,000) feet of Cross Lake,
and (ii) set up a comprehensive regulatory scheme affecting various aspects of drilling activities within five thousand (5,000) feet of Cross
Lake.
Energy Management Corporation acquired mineral leases affecting
Cross Lake, and attempted to negotiate with Shreveport to ease its restrictions within the one thousand (1,000) foot zone. The negotiations
were unsuccessful. In the meantime, Energy Management did not obtain
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a drilling permit from the Office of Conservation. No wells were drilled,
and Energy Management's leases expired,
In 1997, Energy Management filed a lawsuit against the City of
Shreveport, and the court concluded that Ordinance 221 was preempted
by state law and was invalid to the extent that it purported to prohibit the
drilling of oil and gas wells in an area within the State of Louisiana, because such authority to regulate oil and gas drilling was granted exclusively by the State to the Office of Conservation. Energy Management
Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2005). On remand,
the District Court entered judgment as follows:
Ordinance 221 is hereby DECLARED invalid to the extent that it
purports to prohibit the drilling of oil and gas wells in an area within
the State of Louisiana.
Energy Management appealed the District Court's decision, contending that it did not track the language of the prior panel which stated
that the ordinance was preempted by state law, not simply invalid insofar
as it prohibits drilling. Energy Management's concern was that the
overly narrow language in the District Court judgment could lead to the
enforcement of provisions that do not specifically prohibit drilling but
that restrict related activities that make drilling more onerous or burdensome. In reply, the City of Shreveport argued that the only right exclusively granted to the Office of Conservation is oversight of drilling and
that therefore Ordinance 221 is not invalid as to its additional respects.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed its first decision, and stated that it clearly
determined that Ordinance 221 was preempted in its entirety. It was not
simply invalid only to the extent that it concerns actual drilling activities.
The court noted, as it did in the prior opinion, that in every case which
has been brought to its attention involving the challenge to the authority
of the Office of Conservation, the Office's far reaching authority has
been upheld. Thus, there was no basis for the City's argument that its
powers are limited only to drilling activities.
In addition, Energy Management argued that it was entitled to damages from the City of Shreveport under Louisiana law and under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Energy Management argued that it lost its
mineral leases as a result of Shreveport's enforcement of Ordinance 221,
and was entitled to damages in the amount of $9,817,000.
With respect to claim for damages under Louisiana law, the court
found the claim without merit, citing the fact that the prior panel held the
claim to be prescribed.
With respect to the claim for damages under Section 1983, the Fifth
Circuit notes that the statute extends protection to all rights guaranteed
by the 14th Amendment, including substantive due process. In order to
determine whether Energy Management will have, a successful claim
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damages, the court reviewed the City of Shreveport's actions against the
deferential rationil basis test that governs substantive due process. The
first step in this analysis is whether Energy Management can demonstrate
that it has a constitutionally protected property right to which the 14th
Amendment app; es. The court agreed that Energy Management had such
a right. The second step is to determine whether or not the City's actions
were rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court
agreed that the enactment of Ordinance 221 was rationally related to the
City's interest in protecting its water supply. Therefore, because the City
had a rational basis for enacting the ordinance, the fact that a court found
that it was preempted by state law would not convert its actions into a
violation of Energy Management's rights under Section 1983. Based on
the foregoing, the court concluded that Energ Management was not entitled to damages a; a result of Shreveport's enactment of Ordinance 221.
IV. Ownership ofImprovements Permanently Attached to the Ground
(7) Giorgio v. Alliance Operating Corp., 2005-0002 (La. 01/19/06),

921 So.2d 511
A fishing boat allided with an unlit, unmarked orphaned oil field
production platform in the Breton Sound Area, and the plaintiffs and
their boat sustained damages. They sued the State of Louisiana through
the.Department of Natural Resources for damages and injuries sustained
as a result, alleging the State's failure to light the platform in question
caused the allision. The trial court found the State 100% liable for the
damages caused, and the court of appeal affirmed.
The court discussed various maritime law issues, and also stated that
Louisiana law on strict liability may apply as a supplement to the remedies available under general maritime law. The applicable Louisiana law
is Louisiana Civi:. Code Article 2317, under which it is essential that the
State have custody of the structure in question in order for the plaintiffs
to recover. According to the plaintiffs, the State owned the offshore production platform pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code Article 493.
In 1997, Louisiana Civil Code Article 493 provided that:
Buildings, o:her constructions permanently attached to the ground,
and plantings made on the land of another with his consent belong
to him who made them. They belong to the owner of the ground
when they are made without his consent.
When the owner of buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground or plantings no longer has the right to keep
them on the land of another, he may remove them subject to his obligation to restore the property to its former condition. If he does not
remove them within ninety (90) days after written demand, the
owner of the land acquires ownership of the improvements and
owes nothing to their former owner.
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The second paragraph of Article 493 concerns the rights and obligations of the owner of land and the owner of the improvements after their
legal relationship terminates. When that happens, the owner of the improvements has the right to remove them, but if he does not do so within
ninety (90) days after written demand, the owner of the land acquires
ownership of the improvements.
The Supreme Court in this case took the opportunity to overrule
Guzzetta v. Texas Pipeline Company, 485 So.2d 508 (La. 1986). It found
that the clear and unambiguous language of Civil Code Article 493, as
written in 1997, specifically required written notice or demand prior to
the transfer of ownership. In this case, ownership of the offshore production platform remained with the mineral lessee after the State Lease terminated. Because the record contained no evidence of written notice demanding removal of the structure, the court concluded that the State did
not become the owner of the platform.
Note also that Civil Code Article 493 was amended by Act 715 of
2004. As amended, the article now more specifically provides for written
notice and demand prior as a prerequisite to any transfer of ownership of
the improvements to the landowner. The pertinent language in the revised article provides that "[u]ntil such time as the owner of the land appropriates the improvements, the improvements shall remain the property
of he who makes them and he shall be solely responsible for any harm
caused by the improvements."
V. Suitfor Terminationof MineralLease
(8) Pace Royalty Trust Fund, Inc. v. O'Neal, 40,841 (La. App. 2nd

Cir. 04/19/06), 927 So.2d 687
In this case, the plaintiffs, Pace Royalty Trust Fund Inc. and Dzurik
Interest, Inc. appealed a trial court judgment in favor of the defendants,
Ben O'Neal and Sally Webb. The trial court sustained the exception of
no right of action dismissing Pace's claims, and the exception of res judicata dismissing Dzurik's claims.
The dispute arose from the following set of circumstances. Defendants own acreage in DeSoto Parish, and granted a mineral lease on the
property in favor of J.L.H. Enterprises, Inc. Several wells were drilled on
the lease premises. At some point, J.L.H. Enterprises assigned its working interest in the mineral lease to Ida Oil Corporation. In 1992, Sundance Energy Corporation began operating under the lease pursuant to an
agreement with Ida Oil. In 1999, the defendants wrote to Sundance and
Ida Oil alleging that Sundance and/or Ida Oil was late in making a royalty payment, and demanding a release of the lease. Later in 1999, Pace
assumed operations of the wells on the leased premises, and sent the late
royalty payment to the defendants. In March 2000, the defendants filed
an instrument in the public records in which they alleged that the mineral
lease had expired, and then recorded a top lease in favor of C.H.C.
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Gerard. Finally, in March of 2001, Dzurik acquired Ida Oil's interest in
the lease and Pace's interest as operator.
In July 2001, the defendants filed suit against J.L.H. (the original
lessee), Ida Oil (who owned the lease at the pertinent times), and Dzurik
(the current owner of the lease), asking for a declaratory judgment that
the mineral lease was expired. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of the J.L.H., et al, finding that the mineral lease remained in full force
and effect. In February 2005, Dzurik filed a petition for damages against
the defendants, alleging a breach of the mineral lease, bad faith breach of
warranties, breach of peaceable possession and use, constructive eviction
and abuse of process. Defendants filed an exception of res judicata on the
grounds that Dzurik should have asserted all of its claims in the prior
litigation. Also in February 2005, Pace filed a petition for damages
against the defendants alleging breach of the mineral lease causing loss
profits and revenue. Defendants filed an exception of no right of action
on the grounds that Pace did not have an ownership interest in the lease
at any time relevant to the events alleged in Pace's petition. The trial
court sustained both exceptions, and dismissed Dzurik and Pace's claims.
With respect to the exception of res judicata filed against Dzurik,
the court noted. that the applicable law is La. R.S. § 13:4231, which provides that a subsequent action is precluded by res judicata when:
(a) There is a valid and final judgment between the same parties,
(b) The cause of action asserted in the second suit existed at the
time of the final judgment in the first litigation,
(c) The cause of action asserted in the subsequent suit arouse out
of the same transaction or occurrence that was the.subject matter of
the prior litigation.
The court cited prior jurisprudence for the proposition that a "declaratory judgment does not constitute an absolute bar to subsequent proceedings where the party is seeking other remedies, even though based
upon claims which could have been asserted in the original action."
Therefore, Dzurik was not precluded by res judicata from asserting a
claim for damages after the declaratory judgment was rendered.
With respect to the exception of no right of action filed against
Pace, the court noted that Pace did not own an interest in the mineral
lease. Its only -onnection to the pertinent wells was as a contract operator. Therefore, the court agreed with the trial court's granting the exception of no right of action.
VI. Choice of Law
(9) Waterfowf Limited Liability Company v. United kates of America,
473 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 2006)

This case concerns whether Louisiana law or Federal law applies to
determine whether or not a mineral royalty interest acquired by the
- 11 Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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United States as part of a settlement agreement with private mineral servitude owners still exists.
In 1937, the United States purchased approximately 13,000 acres in
Cameron Parish from Lacassine Company, Inc., to be included in the
Lacassine National Wildlife Refuge. Some of this acreage was subject to
a preexisting mineral servitude affecting a 1/2 interest in the minerals. In
the deed from Lacassine to the United States, Lacassine reserved the
minerals in and under the 13,000 acres. As a result, Lacassine owned a
mineral servitude affecting a 100% interest in some of the lands, and a
1/2 interest in the lands subject to the preexisting servitude.
In 1984, the servitude owners sued the United States seeking a declaratory judgment that their servitudes had not prescribed and were still
in existence. In 1988, the parties settled the litigation. In the settlement
agreement, the United States agreed that the servitude was still in existence, and in exchange received a mineral royalty interest carved out of
the servitudes, as well as an interest in bonus and rental payments.
In 2003, Waterfowl Limited Liability Company (who owned a portion of the preexisting servitude) and Lacassine (who owned the Lacassine servitude) sued the United States seeking a declaration that the mineral royalty interest acquired by the United States in the 1988 settlement
agreement had prescribed in accordance with Louisiana law. The United
States stipulated that the mineral royalty interest would have prescribed
under Louisiana law, but argued that Louisiana law does not apply, arguing that federal law controlled the existence and termination of the royalty interest. Because federal law sometimes looks to state law for the
federal rule, the United States also argued that Louisiana law concerning
prescription of nonuse could not be borrowed as the federal rule because
that law would be hostile to its interests.
The Fifth Circuit stated that the applicable law was found in United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Company Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 93 S.Ct.
2389 (1973), which sets up a two step inquiry for determining what law
applies. First, the court must determine whether federal law controls or
whether state law applies of its own force. Second, if the court finds that
federal law controls, it must determine the content of the applicable federal law - the court must decide whether to adopt state law as the federal
rule of decision.
In connection with the first step of the inquiry set forth in Little
Lake Misere, the issue is whether or not the transaction is one arising
from and bearing heavily upon a federal regulatory program. If so, then
state law cannot apply. Federal law undoubtedly applied in the 1984 litigation, which involved rights of the parties under a land acquisition pursuant to a federal program, .the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. The
servitude owners argued that even though federal law controlled in the
litigation, the mineral royalty interest was obtained as consideration in a
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settlement agreemint, and not as part of a land acquisition pursuant to a
federal program. Therefore, federal law should not control. The United
States, on the other hand, contended that the rights obtained in the settlement agreement were obtained in a dispute over federal interests, and
are equally matters of federal law. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
United States, stating that the government obtained the royalty interest
only because it had authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act
to purchase the land burdened by the royalty interest.
Because federal law applies in this case, the next step of the inquiry
according to Little Lake Misere is whether or not to adopt Louisiana law
as the federal rule of decision, even though Louisiana law would not apply of its own force. The government argued that Louisiana law in this
area would be hostile to its interest, so it should not be borrowed as the
federal rule. The Fifth Circuit responded by stating that the fact that application of Louisiana law concerning prescription of nonuse would decrease the amount of money flowing into the federal treasury is not a sufficient reason for refusing to borrow Louisiana law. In order to avoid the
application of Louisiana law, the government must show that it contracted around Louisiana law concerning prescription of nonuse. After
reviewing the 1988 settlement agreement, the court concluded that it did
not affirmatively demonstrate the parties intent with respect to whether
or not they intended to state or federal law to apply. Therefore, the court
remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding on this
issue.

VII. Oil & Gas Related Operations - Damages
(1[0) Barasich

v.

Gulf Transmission

Columbia

Company,

467

F.Supp.2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006)
This lawsuit was filed as a class action on behalf of residents from
several coastal Louisiana Parishes against various pipeline and exploration and productior. companies. The plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants liable for ceitain activities that they claimed contributed significantly to the destructive impact on South Louisiana of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants'
activities in connection with oil and gas exploration damaged the marshland that lies near Louisiana's coastline, thereby weakening a protective
barrier against hurricanes and exposing Louisiana citizens to the prospect
of greater harm from the hurricanes. The defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims, asserting that dismissal for two reasons. First, they claimed that the subject matter of plaintiffs action is
nonjusticiable because it concerns a political question. Second, they argued that plaintiffs did not state a claim upon which relief may be
granted because they cannot prove the elements for recovery as a matter
of law under any available theory.
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With respect to the assertion that the case presents a nonjusticiable
political question, the court cited the six independent tests use to identify
the existence of political question:
(1) A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department, or
(2) A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it, or
(3) The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination ofia kind clearly for non judicial discretion, or
(4) The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches iof government, or
(5) An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or
(6) The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
The court engaged in a detailed analysis of how these factors applied to the plaintiffs' claims, and concluded that the claims do not implicate the political question doctrine as set forth in the test enunciated
above. Therefore, the case should not be dismissed on these grounds.
The second ground upon which the defendants claimed that plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed was for failure to state a claim. The
plaintiffs asserted claims under Louisiana Civil Code Articles 667, 2315,
and 2317.
Article 667 allows a proprietor to engage in activities that do not
"deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may
be the cause of any damage to" the neighbor. With respect to the claim
under Article 667, the court stated that the plaintiffs did not state a claim
because the definition of "neighbor" under Article 667 does not contemplate the relationship between the parties in this case. The plaintiffs were
asking for a finding of liability between parties whose properties are
hundreds of miles apart in many cases, and the court believed that the
relationship between these parties was too attenuated. In addition, as discussed below, the court said the plaintiffs failed to allege that any particular defendant's actions caused any particular plaintiff's harms, which
also precludes recovery under Article 667.
With respect to the plaintiffs' claim under Article 2315, the court
concluded that the defendants do not owe a duty to protect the plaintiffs
from the damage caused by the hurricanes. Had the plaintiffs been in a
contractual relationship with the defendants concerning the wetlands, this
could have served as a platform for implying a duty.
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The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs could not show that
their actions were the legal cause of plaintiffs harms. The court did not
reach this argumcnt, instead finding that the plaintiffs could not show
that the defendant's actions were the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs' harm.
The court noted that the plaintiffs "do not allege that the actions of any
particular defendant were a substantial factor in causing the injuries suffered by any particular plaintiff, nor do they assert a causal connection
linking a particular defendant's operations to a partioular plaintiffs injury." Louisiana law does not allow recovery without the plaintiff demonstrating an individual connection between a defendant's actions and a
plaintiff's harm, and courts have rejected the plaintiffs' theory of a sort
of "group liability" or "market share liability."
Finally, the court states that plaintiffs do not state a claim under Article 2317 because they could not satisfy the cause in fact or legal cause
requirements, whi h are the same requirements discussed above in connection with Article 2315.
The concludi ng paragraph of the opinion sums up the court's feelings about the plaintiffs claims:
By all accounts, coastal erosion is a serious problem in South Louisiana. If plaintiffs are right about the defendants' contribution to
this development, perhaps a more focused, less ambitious lawsuit
between partie-s who are proximate in time and space, with a. less attenuated conrection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's loss, would be the way to test their theory.
(11) Louisiana C'awfish Producers Association - West v. Amerada

Hess Corporation, 2005-1156 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 07/12/06), 935
So.2d 380, writ denied, 2006-2301 (La. 2/8/06), 943 So.2d 1094.
This case was filed by the Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association - West against numerous defendants who engaged in oil and gas
exploration, conducted dredging and pipeline activities, and provided
surveying services for those, onducting such activities. Plaintiff alleged
that in the course :f those activities, defendants created spoil banks and
dams that impeded the natural flow of water in the Buffalo Cove Area,
resulting in stagnant water that destroyed the aquatic ecosystem and
negatively impacted their ability to catch crawfish in the area. Defendants filed numerous exceptions alleging that the plaintiff did not have a
cause of action, primarily based on the its inability to demonstrate a proprietary interest ir the either of the land of Buffalo Cove or the wild
crawfish that its m -mbers sought to catch. The trial court agreed with the
defendants, stating that the plaintiff did not have a claim under state law,
but allowed the plaintiff to proceed with any claims that it may have under maritime law.
According to the court, the applicable rule of law concerning
whether or not plaintiff has a claim is found in Robins Dry Dock & Re- 15
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pair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134 (1927), which states that a
plaintiff cannot recover for economic loss resulting from physical damage to property in which he does not have proprietary interest. The plaintiff argued that it fell within the exception in Robins afforded to commercial fisherman as recognized in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V
TESTBANK, 524 F.Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981) and Union Oil Co. v.

Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). However, the court said that the
exception does not apply in this case, and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for failing to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff also asserted a claim under Louisiana Civil Code Article
667, arguing that a fishing license places one in the category of "persons
holding rights derived from the landowner." However, the court disagreed, noting the distinction between a commercial fishing license,
which is a state granted privilege and is subject to the state's exercise of
its regulatory and police powers, and an interest as a lessee, which is a
state granted interest by the state in its capacity as a landowner.
(12) Hardee v. Atlantic Richfield, 2005-1207 (La. App. 3rd Cir.

4/05/06), 926 So.2d 736.
The plaintiffs sued various oil companies who operate wells in the
Gueydan Oil Field seeking damages suffered as a result of the defendants' oil and gas activities that allegedly contaminated the land owned
by plaintiffs. The defendants filed numerous exceptions, including exceptions of prematurity. With regard to the exception of prematurity, the
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' rights arise only upon termination
of the mineral leases at issue, but not before. The trial court agreed with
the defendants and granted their exceptions of prematurity, dismissing
the plaintiffs' demands against all the defendants.
The court looked to see whether the plaintiffs' petition alleged that
the mineral leases had terminated prior to the filing of the lawsuit, and
found the petition to be unclear on this issue. While the petition did not
allege that the mineral leases had terminated, it also did not allege that
the leases were still in effect. However, after reviewing all of the allegations in the petition, the court stated that the "tenor of the petition is that
all operations have ceased." However, even assuming that the mineral
leases had not terminated, the court rejected the argument made by defendants that the plaintiffs' cause of action did not arise until after the
leases terminated.
The court noted that although Corbello v. Iowa Production,02-826

(La. 2003), 850 So.2d 686 suggests that the duty to restore a leased
premises does not arise until the lease expires, Corbello does not apply in
this case. The court stated that the language in Corbello concerning the
duty to restore a leased premises not arising until after the lease expires
was simply dicta, and that the Supreme Court clarified that statement in
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc., 04-968 (La.

- 16https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol54/iss1/5

16

Dupuis: Case Law Update

2005), 893 So.2d 789. In Castex, it was noted that Corbello involved an
express lease prcvision obligating the lessee to reasonably restore the
premises as nearly as possible to its condition at the beginning of the
lease upon termination of the lease. Accordingly, the Corbello decision
was based upon general principles of contract interpretation. After reviewing the prior cases since Corbello, the court concluded that the applicable rule of law is that "in the absence of an express lease provision,
Mineral Code article 122 does not impose an implied duty to restore the
surface to its original, pre-lease condition absent proof that the lessee has
exercised his rights under the lease unreasonably or excessively."
Based on the foregoing, the court noted that if the defendants have
exercised their rights under the leases unreasonably or excessively, then
Mineral Code Article 122 implies a duty of restoration even if there is no
express lease provision requiring restoration. Therefore, because plaintiffs' petition alleged that the defendants exercised their rights under the
lease unreasonably and excessively, they have alleged a violation of Article 122, and they "have the right to proceed to trial and prove, if they
can, that defendarts have in fact violated the terms of the lease, as well
as their statutory obligations under" Louisiana law. Therefore, the court
reversed the excer tions of prematurity.
VIII. Possession argainst Co-Owners
(13) Hooper v. H~oper, 2006-0825 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 11/02/06), 941
So.2d 726, writ denied, 2006-2823 (La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 177
The plaintiffs sued defendants seeking to be declared the owners of
an undivided 1/16th interest in a 160 acre tract of land in Rapides Parish.
The tract was originally owned by Richard Peerless Hooper Sr. and his
wife Leona Hooper. After Richard's death in 1957, one of his sons, Billy,
began an attempt to acquire the interests of the other co-owners, namely
Richard's widow and his other children. Billy acquired his mother's 1/2
interest on January 13, 1958. On December 27, 1958, he attempted to
purchase the interest of one of his brothers, referred to as R.P. The deed
identified the vendor as Richard Peerless Hooper (Jr.) and recited that he
was "a single man over the age of twenty-one (21) years, herein represented by Leona Sullivan Hooper." In the deed, R.P. conveyed his interest in the property to Billy, reserving a usufruct over the property for his
lifetime, and also reserving the minerals. Importantly, although Leona
executed the instrumet on behalf of R.P., Leona was not properly authorized to do so. R.P1 was brain injured during birth and mentally incompetent all of his life. However, he was not legally recognized as incompetent until 1995, so at the time that Leona executed the instrument
in 1958, she had no judicially recognized authority to act on R.P.'s behalf.
In 2003, Billy's two sons, Edward and Gregory, filed suit against
R.P. seeking to be declared the owner of the undivided 1/16 interest

-

Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007

17

-

17

Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 54 [2007], Art. 5

which had been the subject of 1958 cash deed executed by Leona. In
their petition they asserted that their father, prior to his death, acquired
ownership of R.P.'s interest by acquisitive prescription of thirty (30)
years. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that Billy had acquired R.P.'s 1/16 interest by acquisitive prescription
of thirty years.
The Third Circuit court noted the rule of law with respect to possession and co-ownership: Billy's possession, as a co-owner, was not adverse to his other co-owners unless and until he demonstrated his intent
to possess the 160 acres for himself, and adverse to his co-owners, by
overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice of this intent to his
co-owner, R.P. Applying this standard, the court noted that although
Billy possessed the property in excess of thirty years, and this possession
might have been sufficient to maintain a prescriptive title against a
stranger, it was not sufficient against R.P. as a co-owner, particularly
given R.P.'s mental incompetence. The court stated that the intent to possess adverse must be given to a co-owner, and not to the world in general. Accordingly, because R.P. was incompetent from birth, "no act,
however overt or unambiguous, would have served as notice to him."
The plaintiffs argued that Louisiana Civil Code Article 3474 provides
that prescription will run against incompetents, but the court stated that
Article 3474 applies only to ten year acquisitive prescription, not to thirty
year acquisitive prescription. The court then stated that it didnot need to
reach the issue of whether the thirty year acquisitive prescription runs
against an incompetent because prescription never began to run in this
case. The court stated that Billy's possession of the property began as
equivocal, not adverse to his co-owners. Although the 1958 instrument
might have served as the basis to commence possession adverse to R.P. if
it was translative of title, R.P. retained usufruct over his interest. Therefore, Billy's possession, as naked owner, was precarious.
Because Billy's possession began as precarious and never became
adverse, the trial court's decision was overturned, and plaintiffs claim
based on acquisitive prescription was dismissed.
IX. Ten (10) Year Good Faith Acquisitive Prescription
(14) Mai v. Floyd, 2005-2301, (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/06/06), ---So.2d --

2006 WL 3544811.
The plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against defendant
asserting ownership of a tract of land via acquisitive prescription. The
trial court found that although plaintiff was in possession of the property,
the defendant was the owner thereof. The First Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision, and found that plaintiff was the owner of the lot in question via ten year good faith acquisitive prescription.
Richard and Beulah Albert acquired the property in question in
1984. Unbeknownst to the Alberts, Raymond Floyd purchased a portion
-
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of the property by tax sale in 1986. It appears that the Alberts then sold
to Zare in 1990, who apparently sold to the Tabrizis in 1991. Plaintiff
purchased the property in 1996. In 1996, Floyd filed a petition for monition, and obtained a judgment in his favor. In 2001, plaintiff attempted to
convey the property to a third party, but the attorney hired by the third
party in connection therewith performed a title examination and discovered the previous tax deed.
In 1990 and/or 1991, when Zare and the Tabrizis purported to purchase the land, if they were in good faith, the plaintiff could tack their
possession and become the owner via ten years good faith acquisitive
prescription. The court noted the presumption of good faith, and that it
was up to defendant:, to prove bad faith. Defendants alleged that plaintiff
was in bad faith, but did not present evidence that his ancestors in title,
Zare or the Tabrizis. were in bad faith. The court alluded to the fact that
plaintiffs good or bad faith at the time of his acquisition in 1996 was
immaterial. Rather, because plaintiff tacked the possession of his ancestors in title, their good or bad faith in 1990 and/or 1991 was dispositive.
Therefore, the court found that the good faith presumption was not overcome.
X. Judicial Sales
(15) Guillot v. Laprop, Inc., 2006-0225 (La. App. 5th Cir. 10/06/06),
943 So.2d 541, writ denied, 2006-2656 (La. 1/8/07), 948 So.2d
128.
In 2005, plaintiff sued defendants asking that the court set aside two
1992 sheriffs sales. The defendants filed exceptions of prescription of
two years for the sheriffs sales according to La. R.S. §9:5622. The trial
court sustained the exception of prescription, and dismissed the case. The
defendant appealed, asserting that the statue, which relates to "all informalities of legal procedure" does not apply in this case.
Champagne and Rodgers Realty Company acquired the property via
two sales on December 30, 1992 in satisfaction of a judgment against the
plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that these sales should be set aside as nullities because (i) the attorney who requested issuance of the writs of fieri
facias was not authorized to do so by the board of directors and/or officers of Champagne and Rodgers, and (ii) because the property was partially owned by an estate under administration (the estate of plaintiffs
father) the property could not be seized and sold by a judgment creditor.
The Court of Appeal discussed the applicable statue, La. R.S.
§9:5622, stating that its purpose is to protect good faith purchasers at
judicial sales from litigation concerning minor procedural irregularities
in connection with the sales. It is not, however, intended to cure absolute
nullities, which the court described as matters that go to the essence of
the sales and affect substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the issue for
the court to determine was whether or not the irregularities complained
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of by the plaintiff were simply minor procedural irregularities or more
significant matters that affected substantive rights of the parties.
With regard to the plaintiff s first argument, the court stated that it is
irrelevant that the record contains no corporate authorization for seeking
the writs of fieri facias in connection with the 1992 judicial sales. The
corporation, not its stockholders, was the party in interest, and any question concerning the authority of the corporation to grant the attorney authority to take actions of its behalf is a matter concerning the attorney
and the corporation. It does not concern the plaintiff and his judgment
creditor. However, to the extent that this issue is relevant, it simply constitutes an informality of legal procedure, and therefore would clearly be
subject to the two year prescriptive period of La. R.S. §9:5622.
The court believed that plaintiff s second argument was also without
merit. It interpreted the revision to Louisiana Civil Code 938 as being
remedial interpretive, not as having changed the law. As such, the court
concluded that the statute, both prior to and subsequent to the amendment, allows a successor do exercise his rights of ownership over his interests in an estate, but if a succession representative has already been
qualified, the exercise of that right is subordinate to the administration of
the estate. The succession representative in this case took no action adverse to the sale. It follows, then, that if plaintiff could have alienated the
property himself, his creditors could acquire the property via sheriffs
sale.
XI. Partition by Licitation of Co-Owned Property
(16) Entrada Company, L.L.C v. Moore, 41,414 (La. App. 2nd Cir.
08/09/06), 938 So.2d 1055, writ denied, 2006-2232 (La. 1/8/07),
948 So.2d 123
In this case, Entrada Company, L.L.C. acquired a 7/72 interest in a
tract of land, then filed a suit requesting a partition of the property. The
defendant filed an exception of non-joinder of an indispensable party
claiming that plaintiff should have joined all co-owners. This exception
was denied by the trial court. On May 12, 2005, the trial court granted
the partition by licitation.
The defendants asserted that Entrada filed suit only against some of
the co-owners, when a simple title search would have revealed the unnamed co-owners. For this reason, they believed that Entrada's petition
should have been dismissed due to its failure to join all of the co-owners.
The plaintiff claimed that La. R.S. §13:4985 controls. The statute provides that it is not necessary that all co-owners be joined in a partition
suit - the partition will not affect the interests owned by the co-owners
who were not joined. Defendant countered by arguing that the statute
violates the Louisiana and U.S. constitutions. One argument was that the
successful bidder at the sheriffs sale took a deed of ownership of the
property and now had the potential of acquiring a 100% interest in the

-

20

https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol54/iss1/5

-

20

Dupuis: Case Law Update

property by ten year acquisitive prescription, and that the co-owners who
were not parties to the partition lawsuit could lose ownership after ten
years. Defendants also argued that plaintiff could conspire and selectively litigate against only certain co-owners. In response to this argument, plaintiff pointed out that the Code of Civil Procedure allows defendants to add additional co-owners at any time.
The court concluded that the trial court was correct in rendering
judgment in favor of Entrada, and allowing the partition by licitation. It
agreed with several cases cited by Entrada for the proposition that all coowners need not be joined, and that a suit for partition cannot be defeated
by the peremptory exception of non-joinder of indispensable party. The
court concluded by saying that La. R.S. §13:4895 applies to this particular circumstance - the fact that one or more co-owners are not named in a
suit for partition has no effect on the validity of the partition as to those
who are involved in the case.
XII. Sanctions - Code of Civil Procedure Article 863

(17) Armelise Panting Company v. Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., 20051250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 06/09/06), 938 So.2d 178.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in 2000 against sixty-five defendants who
conducted oil and gas exploration activities that allegedly contaminated
plaintiffs property. Plaintiff amended its petition several times, and
added Builders Center Real Estate Company, L.L.C. as a defendant in
September of 2003. In 2Q04, Builders Center filed an exception of
vagueness on the basis that no specific allegations were made against it,
and alleged that it has never operated a well on plaintiffs property, or
any other property. On plaintiffs motion in March of 2004, Builders
Center was dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit. Builders Center
then moved for imposition of sanctions against plaintiffs attorneys for
adding them to the lawsuit in the first instance. The trial court denied
Builders Center's motion for sanctions.
Builders Center argued that plaintiffs counsel did not conduct a
reasonable investigation into its identity prior to adding it as a defendant.
The record indicated that the plaintiffs attorney was in possession of
information that a company by the name of Plymouth, Inc. was the operator of one or more oil well in controversy, and that in 1975 Plymouth,
Inc. was merged into a company named Builders Center. About a,month
after learning tha: the Builders Center into which Plymouth was merged
was not the same company as the Builders Center named as defendant,
plaintiff moved to dismiss Builders Center from the litigation. Although
Builders Center contended that plaintiffs should have conducted additional investigation into this matter before adding Builders Center as a
defendant, the Fir st Circuit disagreed. It noted that the lawsuit was complex litigation involving numerous defendants and that plaintiffs counsel
simply made a mistake by naming Builders Center as defendant. Impor- 21 Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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tantly, the court stated that plaintiff exercised reasonable care in investigating the facts prior to adding Builders Center as a defendant, and took
action to dismiss Builders Center after it learned of its mistake.
XIII. Successions - Last Will and Testament
(18) Succession of LaNasa, 2006-561 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/27/06),
948 So.2d 288.
This case involved the validity of a notarial will dated November 6,
2003. In this will, Dr. LaNasa left certain property to his grandchildren,
great grandchildren and his children. His will stated further "it is my specific desire that my present wife, Barbara LaNasa, get nothing from my
estate." In 2005, Barbara LaNasa filed a petition alleging that the November 6, 2003 testament was invalid because Dr. LaNasa was physically unable to read, and that the testament was not read aloud in the
presence of the testator, notary, and two competent witnesses, as required
by Louisiana Civil Code Article 1579. Barbara LaNasa further argued
that Dr. LaNasa's children influenced Dr. LaNasa and encouraged him to
disinherit her, because she and Dr. LaNasa were quarreling at the time
that the will was executed. The trial court found that the will was invalid
because Dr. LaNasa did not have his reading machine (which was necessary for him to read) at the time that the will was executed, and that the
formalities of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1579 were not followed.
The evidence indicated that Dr. LaNasa suffered from macular degeneration, and that he was "legally blind" and unable to read without
the assistance of a reading machine. The evidence also indicated that the
will in question was executed in a hurry by an attorney with whom Dr.
LaNasa was not familiar. Dr. LaNasa contacted the attorney and dictated
the basic terms of the will over the telephone, and the attorney drafted
the will that same day. Later in the day, the will was executed by Dr.
LaNasa. The attorney did not recall reading the will aloud while Dr.
LaNasa was in his office.
The evidence indicated that Dr. LaNasa required the assistance of a
reading machine in order to read, and that he did not use the machine to
read the will. The evidence also indicated that the will was not read aloud
in Dr. LaNasa's presence prior to being executed. After reviewing the
evidence, the court cited that the strong public policy in favor of maintaining a will of the testator, and held that "because Dr. LaNasa could
read with magnification, the formalities of La. C.C. art. 1579 were not
required."
(19) Succession of Caillouet, 2005-0957 (La. App. 4th Cir. 06/14/06),
935 So.2d 713, writ denied, 2006-1732 (La. 10/6/06), 938 So.2d
85.
This case concerned the validity of a handwritten instrument purporting to be the will of Anna Rita Babin King Caillouet. The instrument
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was entitled "My Last Will," and was signed "Auntie." The trial court
found that the signature was sufficient, and that the document otherwise
met the formal requirements of an olographic testament.
At issue in the appeal was whether or not Mrs. Caillouet's signature,
"Auntie" satisfies the requirement of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1575.
The court cited several prior decisions concerning the sufficiency of signatures to purpoited olographic wills. In one, Succession of Bacot, 502
So.2d 1118 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), the court found that a signature of a

person's middle ind last name only was sufficient. In another, Succession of Cordaro, 126 So.2d 809 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1961), the court
found'that the use of a person's first name only was sufficient. The reasoning behind these decisions is that the purpose of the signature is to
identify the testalor, so it does not matter that the signature does not recite the complete name of the testator.
In this case, the evidence indicated that Mrs. Caillouet was known
generally in her fimily as "Auntie." Therefore, it was reasonable to conclude that Mrs. Caillouet intended for the word "Auntie" to serve as her
signature, which :'ulfilled the requirements of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1575.
(20) Succession o!fMorgan, 2005-1725 (La. App. 1 Cir. 06/09/06), 938
So.2d 196.
This case concerned the last will and testament of Arvie L. Morgan,
which was originally probated as a notarial will. Two of thQpamed legatees were sisters, who also signed the will as witnesses. The trial court
denied the sisters' motion to amend the probate proceedings so that the
will would be prcbated as an olographic will, but ruled that the legacies
made by the testaors should "be given full effect in accordance with testator's intent as expressed in olographic form." The executrix appealed
the court decision, contending that the witnesses should not be allowed to
receive any legacies under the testament.
The First Circuit cited the settled jurisprudence in Louisiana that an
olographic will that contains subscribing witnesses is still valid. The signatures of the witnesses are "mere surplusage," and are disregarded. Because testaments that otherwise meet legal formalities are not invalid
simply because they also contain needless or superfluous formalities, the
will was given full effect in olographic form.
XIV. Successions - Judgment of Possession
(21) Succession of Crumbley, 2006-402 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 09/27/06),
940 So.2d 748.
The decedent died in 1999 and was survived by her husband and
children. After the Judgment of Possession was rendered, the surviving
spouse filed a petition to annul it, arguing that neither he nor his attorney
received copies o:7 the detailed descriptive list of assets or other docu-
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ments which were filed in connection with the Judgment of Possession.
He further stated that some of his separate funds were incorporated into
the community of acquets and gains. The court ruled in favor of the surviving spouse, and declared the Judgment of Possession a nullity.
The Third Circuit found it important that the executor was aware of
the surviving spouse's status as an interested party, and that he was represented by counsel. Furthermore, the executor was also aware that the
surviving spouse disputed the descriptive list of assets and claimed that
certain property was his separate property, not community property.
Therefore, it agreed with the trial court's determination that the Judgment of Possession was a nullity.
XV. Successions - Dealing with Interest in Succession Prior to Judgment of Possession
(22) Anglin v. Anglin, 2005-1233 (La. App. 1st Cir. 06/09/06), 938
So.2d 766.

The property that was the subject of this litigation was owned by
Baty and Maggie Anglin. Baty died and his Judgment of Possession
placed Maggie into possession of a 1/2 interest in the property, and their
children into possession of the other 1/2 interest. Hillard Anglin was a
son of Baty and Maggie, and he was the father of seven (7) children, five
(5) of which are the plaintiffs herein. After Maggie and Hillard died, the
plaintiffs owned an interest in the property. Before Maggie and Hillard's
successions were opened, the plaintiffs and William Anglin (one of
Hillard's children who is not a plaintiff herein) discussed partitioning the
property. The plaintiffs donated their interest in the property to William,
allegedly in order to conveniently handle a judicial partition of the property. The petition further alleged that William promised to not record the
donations and transfer the plaintiffs' interests back to them immediately
after the partition was obtained.
The donations were executed in 1999. The Judgment of Possession
in the Maggie's succession was rendered in 2000. On February 8, 2001,
the Acts of Donation in favor of William were recorded. On July 26,
2001, the Judgment of Possession in Hillard's succession recognized the
donations, placed William into possession of Hillard's former interest.
After this Judgment of Possession was rendered, William acquired the
remaining interests in the property from the other co-owners by sales
from some co-owners and by partition from others. Finally, on September 11, 2001, he mortgaged the property.
Several months after William mortgaged the property, the plaintiffs
filed the instant lawsuit seeking to annul their donations, and to cancel
the mortgage to the extent that it affected their interest. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that at the
time of the donations, an heir or legatee could transfer a specific thing
before being placed into possession thereof in succession proceedings.
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Dupuis: Case Law Update

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that this case is governed by a Succession of Stouffet, 95-0116 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/09/95), 665 So.2d 98.
The rule of Stouqflet is that a sale of an heir's interest in a particular piece
of property belonging to a succession is an absolute nullity. In 1997,
Civil Code Article 938 was enacted. As originally written, it provided in
pertinent part that "[p]rior to the qualification of a succession representative, a successor may exercise rights of ownership with respect to his
interests in the estate." It was amended by Act No. 556 of 2001 so that it
provided in pertinent part that "[p]rior to the qualification of a succession
representative, a successor may exercise rights of ownership with respect
to his interests in a thing of the estate as well as his interest in the estate
as a whole." Note that the original version of Article 938 was in effect at
the time that the donations to William were executed.
Thus, the issue before the court was the effect of the 2001 revision.
The court concluded that the revision of Article 938 was merely interpretive; it was meant to clarify the original version, not to change it. Thus,
the court concluded that the original enactment of Article 938 authorized
an heir to exercise his rights of ownership with respect to particular
property in an es;tate, not only on his interest in the entire estate. Based
on this conclusion, the court did not reach the issue of whether or not the
revision should be applied retroactively.
XVI. Donations - Nullity

(23) Funk v. Clement, 2005-966 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 03/15/06), 925
So.2d 717, writ denied, 2006-1167 (La. 9/15/06), 936 So.2d 1270.
In 1995, thc Funks sued Dr. Clement and his medical corporation
for medical malpractice. At the time, Dr. Clement owned certain property, and his corporation owned other iroperty. Between 1997 and 1999,
Dr. Clement donated certain immovable property to a trust which was
created in 1997, and also executed donations on behalf of the corporation
in favor of the trust. The Funks obtained a judgment in their malpractice
suit against Dr. Clement and the corporation on February 27, 2002.
The Third circuit stated that "the underlying purpose of the donations was to remove the corporations and Dr. Clement's own property
from the reach of their creditors, including the Funks," and that the actions violated public policy.
With respect to the donations of corporate property, the court found
that the donation; were relatively null because Dr. Clement lacked the
capacity to make them. The corporate resolution not specifically give Dr.
Clement authority to make a donation of corporate property.
XVII. Mandate and Donations to Trust
(24) Succession cf Gore, 2005-0549 (La. App. 4th Cir. 05/10/06), 931
So.2d 1150, writ denied, 2006-1448 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 394.
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In 1996, Connie Gore executed a general power of attorney in favor
of Hazel Lansou. The instrument provided in pertinent part that Ms. Lansou was granted:
The general and specific power of attorney to represent and act on
my behalf regarding all and every act, matter, and thing whatsoever,
as shall or may be requisite and necessary, touching or concerning
the affairs, business or assets of appearer as fully, completely and
effectively, and to all intents and purposes with the same validity, as
if all and every such act, matter or thing, were or for, or as appearer
could or might do if personally present; also with full power of substitution and revocation; appearer hereby agrees to ratify and confirm all and whatsoever the said agent shall lawfully do or cause to
be done by virtue of this act of procuration.
In 2001, Ms. Lansou executed two instruments, one of which purported to create a trust, and the other of which purported to donate certain property to the trust. These instruments were executed by Ms. Lansou as agent and attorney-in-fact for Mrs. Gore.
A lawsuit was subsequently filed challenging the creation of the
trust and the donations. The trial court held that "the Trust is invalid as to
form and the donations were not expressly mandated by Connie Gore,"
reasoning that the instrument granting Ms. Lansou power to act for Ms.
Gore did not specifically authorize Ms. Lansou to make inter vivos donations on behalf of Ms. Gore.
The Fourth Circuit first considered the issue of whether or not the
power of attorney empowered Ms. Lansou to create the trust. The court
cited the applicable law, found in La. R.S. §§ 9:1752 and 9:1763, which
provides that a trust may be created by authentic act or by act under private signature in the presence of two witnesses and duly acknowledged,
and that a person having capacity to contract by onerous or gratuitous
title may be a settlor of an onerous or gratuitous inter vivos trust. Further,
the court cited Louisiana Civil Code Article 2997 for the proposition that
authority must be given expressly to a mandatary to make an inter vivos
donation. The court noted that the power of attorney failed to grant Ms.
Lansou express authority to make donations, and thus, she could not create the gratuitous inter vivos trust. The court agreed with the reasoning in
Succession of Aucoin, 771 So.2d 286 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/08/00) which
held that a power of attorney "which does not expressly and explicitly
confer upon the agent the power to donate the principal's interest in immovable property, did not authorize" a donation.
Finally, the court rejected the arguments that the trust instrument
was ratified, or that the power of attorney should be reformed to reflect
the principal's intentions, which supposedly included allowing Ms. Lansou to make inter vivos donations on her behalf.
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XVIII. Donationts Omnium Bonorum
(25) Trahan v. Bertrand, 2006-1271 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 02/21/07); -So.2d -- 2107 WL 518777.

This lawsuit was filed by Virgie Bertrand in an attempt to set aside
two 1992 donations as donations omnium bonorum. The donors of the
donations at issue were Ira and Olivia Bertrand. Virgie and Alfred Bertrand were Ira and Olivia's children. Ira and Olivia passed away in 1992
and 2000, respectively. The donations were executed in favor of Alfred.
Virgie bought this lawsuit as administratrix of Olivia's estate. In the petition, Virgie asserted that the two donations divested Ira and Olivia of all
of their immovable property, leaving them in the necessitous circumstances. In response, Alfred filed a peremptory exception of no right of
action and prescription. The trial court sustained the exception of no right
of action as to her standing to filing the petition in her capacity as administratrix of her mother's estate and in her individual capacity as a forced
heir of her mother, but denied the exception as to Virgie's capacity to file
the petition as a forced heir of her father. The court also denied the exception of prescription, finding that a cause of action based on a donation
omnium bonorun is imprescriptible.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1498 provides in pertinent part that a
"donation inter 'vivos shall in no case divest the donor of all his property;
he must reserve to himself enough for subsistence." The court reviewed
the little jurisprudence on this issue, noting the following principles. The
right to contest a donation omnium bonorum may be bought only by the
donor or by his forced heirs. Additionally, because a donation omnium
bonorum is absolutely null, an action to set aside such a donation is imprescriptible. Based on these principles, the Third Circuit affirmed the
trial court's decis;ion in granting defendant's exception of no right of action with regard to the suit as filed by Virgie in her capacity as the administratrix of Olivia's estate. In that capacity, she was neither the donor
nor a forced heir The trial court was also correct in finding that because
of the forced heirship laws in effect at the time of Ira's death, she did
have standing to bring the action as a forced heir, but because of the revision in the forcec heirship laws, she had no standing to bring an action as
a forced heir of Olivia.
The court tlen discussed whether or not Virgie's claim as a forced
heir of Ira had prescribed or whether the action is imprescriptible. The
court rejected the suggestion that this type of action might be more properly characterized as an action to reduce an excessive donation impinging
on a legitime uncer Louisiana Civil Code Articles 1503 and 1504, which
action has a five year liberative prescriptive period. Rather, the court was
of the opinion that a donation omnium bonorum is imprescriptible, and
as such, "it cannot somehow become legitimate again" because of the
passage of a prescriptive period.
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XIX. After Acquired Title Doctrine
(26) Baudoin v. Spruill, 2006-161 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 5/31/06), 931
So.2d 549.
While the plaintiff and defendant were married, they purchased a
tract of land in 1998. In the Act of Sale, the vendors reserved timber and
mineral rights. The plaintiff and defendant were divorced in 2002, and
the community property partition awarded the property to plaintiff. In
2004, plaintiff filed a petition against the heirs of the landowner who reserved the timber rights to fix a time for removal of the timber. Plaintiff
then added defendant to this lawsuit after defendant purchased all of the
merchantable timber on the tract from the heirs of the landowner who
reserved the timber, alleging that once defendant acquired ownership of
the timber, plaintiff came to own the timber by application of the after
acquired title doctrine. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, holding that the after acquired title doctrine applied in this case.
The issue before the Third Circuit was whether or not the after acquired title doctrine applied under the present facts. The court states that
the doctrine applies "when a vendor sells property which he does not
own and later acquires title, ownership vests in the vendee." The court
found that the after acquired title doctrine did not apply in this case for
the following reason. Because Louisiana Civil Code Article 464 provides
that standing timber is a separate immovable when it belongs to a person
other than the owner of the ground, the timber could not have been included in the community property partition agreement. Defendant did not
acquire ownership of the timber until a later time, when he purchased the
same from the heirs of the vendors who reserved the timber.
Judge Decuir wrote a concurring opinion and expanded and elaborated on the court's reasoning. He stated that "in order for the doctrine of
after acquired title to apply in this case, the standing timber at issue must
have been presumed to be owned by the community prior to its partition,
and it must have been purportedly conveyed to [plaintiff] in the community property partition." Because separate ownership of the timber was
clearly evidenced by the deed in which the timber was reserved, and because the community property partition did not purport to convey the
timber to plaintiff, the after acquired title doctrine could not apply.
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